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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROCKY MOUNTAIN GIANT

TIRE SERVICE, INC.,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 1555 3

BRAD RAGAN, INC . ,

Defendant and
Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action by Rocky Mountain Giant Tire Service
to recover for tires sold to Brad Ragan, Inco
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried to the Honorable James S. Sawaya,
District Judge, and judgment was entered for plaintiff for

the sum of $5,575.00 plus costs and interest.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment entered in

the lower court

0
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a case where the testimony of the respondent's
witness differed sharply with the testimony of appellant's
two witnesses.

Appellant's Statement of Facts sets forth the

version of the transaction favorable to it and virtually ignon
the facts favorable to respondent's position and the facts
supporting the trial court's judgment.
Ralph Albertson, an employee of Rocky Mountain Giant
Tire Service, and Arlo Murkin, an employee of Brad Ragan,
entered into an oral agreement wherein Brad Ragan agreed to
purchase from Rocky Mountain certain tires which had been used
and discarded by Kennett Copper Corporation.

Mr. Albertson ana

Mr. Murkin traveled to the Kennecott Mine in Salt Lake City and
inspected the tires which Mr. Albertson had previously selectec
(R. 101, 115-116, 127).

The price and freight rate were agreed

on by both parties (R. 127).

Mr. Murkin testified that the sale

was subject to additional inspection in Arizona (R. 127-128),
while Mr. Albertson testified that the sale was "as is," with
the exception of eleven tires which will be discussed below
(R. 116).
Seven shipments

totaling 70 tires were made to Brad Raga:
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and billed by invoices dated September 16 through November 6,
1975 for a total purchase price of $15,100.00 (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1, R. 101-102).

Brad Ragan made three payments on

the tires totaling $7,525.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 3, 4 and 5,

R. 104-105).

In addition, Rocky Mountain gave Brad Ragan

credit for eleven tires (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, R. 98).

Thus,

the total purchase price less payments and credit was the
$5,575.00, which the court awarded to the respondent.
Mr. Albertson testified that he had been in the tire
business since 1950 and he had been selling these tires to recapping shops on an "as is" basis for ten to fifteen years and
that other people in the industry were doing business the same
way (R. 116-117).

Brad Ragan attempted to show that industry

practice was not to buy used tires without making machine inspections.

However, on cross-examination, appellant's witness,

Mr. Murkin, admitted that every transaction in the industry was
different and that there was not really anything that could be
considered industry practice in the buying of used tires (R. 148).
On October 14 and 15, 1975, Mr. Albertson was in Tucson,
Arizona and was told by appellant's employees that they were satisfied with the tires which had been shipped by respondent (R.107).
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On November 28, 1975, Mr. Albertson was again in Tucson to
collect for the tires which had been delivered (R. 107-108),
At this time, Brad Ragan had made two payments on the tires
as follows:

October 24 in the amount of $2,025.00 and

November 7 in the amount of $2,375.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibits
3 and 4).

These payments are for the identical amounts of

the first two invoices for the first two shipments to Brad
Ragan.
The background on the credit memo for eleven tires was
established in response to the questions of the court to
Mr. Albertson.

Mr. Albertson stated that when he and Mr.

Murkin were looking at the tires, there were eleven tires
which were marginal but which Mr. Murkin said he might be
able to do something with because of the type of shop he had
in Tucson.

The tires were then shipped on the chance that they

would be usable but when it was discovered they were too far
gone, a credit memo was issued (R. 124).

These eleven tires

were shipped on November 6, 1975 and the respondent was informed by a telephone call on November 10, 1975 that the tires
were not usable, and tre credit memo issued (Plaintiff's
hibits 1 and 2, R, 124).
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Ex-

POINT I
THE PREVAILING PARTI IN THE TRIAL COURT IS ENTITLED ON APPEAL
TO ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE

IN THE LIGHT FAVORABLE TO THE JUDGMENT.

The appellant properly points out and the trial court
correctly identified the central issue in this law suit was
whether the tires were sold "as is" or subject to inspection
(R. 177).

Appellant claims the trial court findings are in-

consistent or incomplete because an express finding on whether
the contract was conditional was not made and because credit
for eleven unusable tires was given.

These findings are

clearly consistent with the evidence and clearly demonstrate
what the court found.
For the appellant to argue that the findings are fatally
incomplete is to ask the Court to ignore the well-established
rule of review.

This standard is set forth in Olsen vs. Park

Daughters Investment Company, 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145
(1973), as follows:
"Further, the trial court having refused
to be so persuaded, this court on appeal
would not upset his findings and judgment,
and order findings and judgment to the
contrary, unless the evidence were such
that all reasonable minds must necessarily
so find; and in making that determination,
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we review the evidence and all reasonable
inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in
the light favorable to his findings and
judgment."
This standard of review is especially appropriate in
this case.

The trial judge observed the witnesses and was in

a position to judge their credibility.

The witnesses told

markedly different versions of how the transactions developed
and the court's findings and judgment clearly demonstrate that
the court accepted the respondent's version.

The trial court

entered a judgment for the total purchase price of all tires
shipped, less the three payments by appellant and the credit
for the eleven tires.

This is what the respondent's invoices

show and what the respondent's testimony demonstrated
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 to 5, R. 98-105, 124).
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from this evi·
dence is that appellant was obligated to pay for all tires
regardless of their recap ability, i.e., the agreement was not'
conditional.

The credit invoice for the eleven tires was the

subject of a separate agreement in accordance with Mr. Albertsc:
testimony (R. 124).
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POINT II
THERE IS A REASONABLE BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Honorable Court has consistently held that where
there is "any reasonable basis" in the evidence to support
the findings of the trial court, the findings will not be
overturned.

In Holman vs. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976),

Justice Ellett said:
"The policy of this Court has been,
after reviewing the record, not to
disturb the trial court's findings if
there is a reasonable basis in evidence
to support it. Appellants carry out
the burden of showing from the record
that the lower court erred."
Also, see First Western Fidelity vs. Gibbons & Reed Co., 27
Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971).
The recent case of Hanover Ltd. vs. Fields, 568 P.2d 751
(Utah 1977), explains the standard which appellants must meet
if the trial judge's findings are to be reversed.

The Court

said:
"In regard to the remaining assertions
of error, this court is constrained to
look at the whole of the evidence in
the light favorable to the trial court's
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findings, including any fair inferences
to be drawn from the evidence and all
of the circumstances shown. The trial
court's findings shall not be disturbed
unless the evidence is such that all reasonable minds would be persuaded to the
contrary."
When the parties to an action each produce evidence
supporting its action, this Court has consistently refused
to reverse the trial court unless the evidence is so convincing that reasonable men could not differ as to the results
which the evidence dictated.

For example, in Koesling vs.

Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975), this Court upheld the
trial court's determination and made these cormnents:
"Plaintiff produced evidence tending to
prove the existence of a partnership.
Defendant produced opposing evidence and
further produced evidence which tended
to prove a joint venture of the nature
heretofore described. The trial court,
exercising its prerogative as a trier of
fact in a nonjury case, weighed the credibility of the witnesses and was not
persuaded by plaintiff's evidence. This
court will not disturb such a determination
when reasonable men could differ as to the
weight to be given to conflicting evidence."
Thus, it is clear that the trial court will not be over·
turned if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to
support the findings.

At the same time, the appellant
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must

show that "all reasonable minds would be persuaded to the
contrary" before the lower court can be reversed.
THE EVIDENCE
There is clearly a reasonable basis in the evidence to
support the findings of the trial court.

Respondent's

employee, Ralph Albertson, testified that he had been selling
used tires on an "as is" basis for ten to fifteen years
(R. 116-117).

On cross-examination, appellant's witness,

Arlo Murkin, admitted buying practices vary widely in the used
tire business.
ent.

Mr. Murkin said "Every transaction is differ-

There is no two transactions that are anything that

would be considered industry practice in buying of used
tires."

(R. 148).

The appellant was paying between one hundred

and two hundred fifty dollars plus freight per used tire and
would sell the tire for as much as $7,000.00 after it had been
recapped (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, R. 129, 148).

When

Mr, Albertson traveled to Tucson on October 14 and 15, he was
told by appellant's employees that they were satisfied with
the tires which had been shipped (R. 107).

By this date, at

least twenty-seven of the total of seventy tires had been
shipped to Tucson.

It is reasonable to conclude that when a
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$200.00 used tire can be recapped and sold for $7,000.00, the
purchaser would be willing to make this small investment on
the tire on an "as is" bas is and take the chance that some of
the tires would not be usable.

This is a simple economic de-

cision that is made daily by businesses which purchase products
"as is."

Appellant claimed that fifty per cent of the tires

were not usable, but at the same time, Mr. Murkin admitted
that nothing was said to Mr. Albertson about rejected tires
during the October 14 and 15 visit (R. 146).
On September 16, 1975, appellant was invoiced for nine
tires in the sum of $2,025.00 and the second invoice on
September 23, 1975 was for ten tires in the sum of $2, 375.00.
The first payment to respondent was made October 24, 1975 for
the sum of $2, 025. 00 and the second payment was made November

7 for the sum of $2,375.00.

Thus, after the October 14-15

meeting in Tucson, it is reasonable to conclude appellant
paid the first two invoices and made no complaints about the
quality of the casings.

This is consistent with the nature of

the agreement since appellant had nothing to complaint about
for tires which were purchased "as is."
[.

The credit memo for the eleven tires supports respondent'
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position.

The background on the credit memo was established

by questions from the court.
"THE COURT: Mr. Albertson, what gave rise to
the Credit Memo of November 10th for twentythree hundred and seventy-five dollars for
eleven tires? How did that come about?
"THE WITNESS: Those were eleven tires that
were marginal. When we were up here looking
at these tires, these eleven were marginal,
didn't know whether they could go or not but
Mr. Murken told me with his type of a shop
that he could do more with the tires than most
anybody else in the same type of business because he was so diversified now. I said 'Well,
take these on a chance that they will go,' so
I billed them out and then come to find out that
they were too far gone and issued him credit for
the full amount per tire.
"THE COURT: How did you become aware that they
weren't useable?

"THE WITNESS:

He notified me by phone.

"THE COURT: All right. But as I understand it,
this was prior to the conversation you had with
regard to disposing of junk tires?
"THE WITNESS:

Correct."

(R. 124)

These eleven tires were shipped within one or two days
from the November 6th invoice date and by November 10, the
appellant had notified Mr. Albertson that the tires were not
recappable and a credit memo was issued (R. 121).

According

to respondent's invoices, these eleven tires were the last of
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the seventy tires shipped.

The obvious question is why was

nothing said regarding the other twenty-four tires appellant
claimed were rejected at the time of the pre-November 10th
telephone call, or otherwise.

The only reasonable answer is

that appellant knew it had purchased all but the eleven tires
"as is" and did not have the right to complain.

Mr. Murkin

admitted that all tires were inspected within a few days of
arrival and that appellant's policy was to notify
of any rejected tires (R. 145).

the shipper

At the same time, he admitted

there was no notice of any rejected tires although the shipment:

')11

"II

were all received over a three-month period prior to the
November 29th meeting (R.145-146).
There is considerable discussion in appellant's brief
about the November 29th visit of Mr. Albertson to Arizona to
collect money.

Mr. Albertson denied seeing any inspection

sheets for tires at that time (R. 117).

Mr. Albertson was

looking for the balance due based on his invoices (R. 118) ·
There was some discussion about discarding the eleven tires but
no reference to any other tires being junked (R. 122-123).
At the time of this meeting, Mr. Albertson was handed a
copy of defendant's Exhibit 15, but he was not aware of the
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exact amount owing inasmuch as he did not have his invoices
with him.

However, he did not agree that the amount shown on

defendant's Exhibit 15 was the amount owing (R. 112, 158-159,
164-165).

A fair reading of the record on Mr. Albertson's testi-

mony regarding the November 29th meeting shows that he was at
one point confused about the discussion on the amount due and
the court recognized as much (R. 119, 123).

Mr. Murkin did

admit that he did not have Mr. Albertson sign defendant's
Exhibit 15, which is what would be expected if any entirely new
bargain was made at that point (R. 163).

The best evidence of

the fact that Mr. Albertson did not agree to the accounting
urged by appellant is that on November 30, 1975, a Sunday and
the day he returned to Salt Lake City, he had prepared a statement showing the full amount due (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6).

The

original of this statement was mailed to appellant and when the
subsequent payment made on the account is subtracted from the
balance shown on this statement, the sum of the judgment,
$5,575.00, is reached.
Appellant cites the Uniform Commercial Code as though it
supports its position, when the Code clearly recognizes "as is"
sales and the specific section relied on by appellant begins
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"unless otherwise agreed."

Sections ?OA-2-316 and 513, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
uation here.

That is precisely the sit-

The parties agree that the sale was to be "as is",

and the trial court so found.
Appellant would justify its employees' conduct in this
case by attempting to change the underlying agreement after
all the tires had been shipped.

Except for the eleven tires

which were part of a separate agreement, as the facts clearly
indicate, the witnesses all agreed that respondent was never
notified of rejected tires prior to November 29.

At this time,:

the appellant attempted to avoid paying its just obligation by
Thus, appellant would have this

making a separate accounting.

I

Court ignore the entire history of the transaction to the date
of November 29, and then on the basis of a self-serving account·
ing, unsigned by respondent, avoid paying for the tires as per
the agreement.

The trial court had the benefit of observing

the witnesses during their testimony and found that appellant'i
attempt to avoid payment was not justified.

The trial judge

should be affirmed in so finding.
POINT III
INTEREST WAS PROPERLY AWARDED ON THE JUDGMENT.
The trial court found that even after the appellant '5k
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payment on December 19, 1975, there was owing to respondent
$5,575000.

Interest was then awarded from that date to judg-

ment at the legal rate of six per cent per annum and from the
date of judgment at eight per cent per annum.

Interest at 8%

per annum on the judgment is mandated by Section 15-1-4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
The Utah Supreme Court established the guideline for
awarding pre-judgment interest in Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. vs.
Board of Education, 61 Utah 149, 211 P. 981 (1922).

The test

was whether the damages were complete and could be ascertained
as of a particular time and in accordance with known standards
of value.

Here, the court determined that the additional

$5,575.00 was due when the last payment was received and was
therefore justified in awarding the pre-judgment interest at
the legal rate.
The fact that the complaint does not specifically pray
for pre-judgment interest is of little consequence.

Rule 54(c),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides " .... every final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in its pleadings."
Other jurisdictions have applied similar rules and allowed
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the awarding of interest even when not specifically sought in
the complaint.

Arizona Title Insurance and Truck Co. vs.

O'Malley Lumber Co., 14 Ariz. App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971);
Checker Incorporated vs. Zaman, 467 P.2d 100 (Nev. 1970).
CONCLUSION
There is substantial evidence to support the court's find·
ings and judgment.

Certainly, there is a reasonable basis for

the findings and the clear inference from the specific findingo,
is that the agreement was unconditional.

The weight of the

evidence favors the trial court's findings and this court shouli 1
not reverse based on the re-argument of the evidence by appel1<

1

Only on appeal has the appellant decided that what it wa>,
arguing for at trial did not even make sense mathematically.
Accordingly, the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR

t c~'

a4 ~/*-

F. Robert Bayle

}

Lewis B. Quigle1

(

Attorneys for Respondent
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I hereby certify that three (3) copies of the Brief
of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to Kay M. Lewis,
Esq. and Lawrence E. Corbridge, Esq. of Jensen & Lewis,
Attorneys for Appellant, 320 South 300 East Street, Suite 1,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this~-·-··- day of June, 1978.
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